ABSTRACT We introduce a new paradigm for the cooperation of cloud monitoring and study the annual fee-setting problem under uncertainty. First, a value network of cloud monitoring and different monitoring service modes are studied. Second, we express the fee-setting problem for cloud monitoring as a chanceconstrained bilevel optimization model, where the fee-setter acts as a leader, and all the clients act as followers who make decisions based on the price they receive. Third, optimal fee-setting and the interaction between the platform and clients are analyzed. Finally, numerical experiments are designed and implemented on a monitoring platform, and pricing policy and decision-making under uncertainty on unplanned downtime rate are analyzed. The proposed paradigm and model do not only target a specific cloud service, and thus they can be applied to other similar public platforms provided as services.
I. INTRODUCTION
On one hand, private investment is becoming more popular than ever in infrastructure projects, and many public information platforms for production safety monitoring are now built by private companies. An investing company, typically a production equipment manufacturer, builds a public information platform, promotes relevant equipment to factories by the platform, and gains monitoring contracts from factory clients. The company collects fees in return of its investment based on contracts after a warranty period for production equipment.
On the other hand, cloud manufacturing, a new manufacturing paradigm based on a cloud platform [1] , [2] , has brought new opportunities to manufacturing industry by allowing factories and organizations to outsource their monitoring of production equipment to cloud providers and thus avoid the need to establish their own application, platform, and infrastructure (hereinafter, all of the above things are referred to asthe platform) using their own capital.
Outsourcing of production equipment maintenance and cloud manufacturing are current hot topics and also development trends. More and more factories outsource their equipment maintenance tasks and related workers to platforms to reduce cost and improve safety. Those platforms, usually suppliers or manufacturers of production equipment, often centrally monitor production equipment distributed worldwide. A public platform can reduce cost and achieve high operational efficiency by sharing maintenance personnel and accessories with other social third-parties.
Furthermore, cloud clients can access all of their required capabilities over the Internet transparently by services encapsulation and virtualization access [3] , [4] , monitor their production, diagnose equipment failures, schedule repair tasks, and pay for what they use without being concerned with the underlying infrastructure. As a result, clients experience the comfort of traditional software, platform, and infrastructure such as sensor, network, server, data center, application, and internet. Advantages such as a source sharing model, in addition to accessibility, scalability, and ease of management, have created an industry-wide shift towards cloud manufacturing solutions.
With the help of modern information technology, companies are now able to estimate costs more accurately than before, and thus make better pricing decisions. However, once a price is set by the platform, it has to be constant for over a time period. This implies that the fee-setting decision is made under a long-term forecast and uncertain information. In most situations, contracts between a fee-setter and its clients will be signed before the generation of a large amount of data, and the fee usually is required to be unchanging for a minimum period. Therefore, the platform owner has to make the feesetting decisions under uncertainty before clients make their decisions on future participation.
Recently, a number of studies that aim at system architecture design, communication mechanism, and cost minimization of cloud platforms have been proposed, but less attention has been given to profit maximization under uncertain cloud conditions.
Revenue and profit are two important factors for cloud providers to remain in business. In recent years, annual fees have become a primary way to encourage private platform investors. Along with growing cloud monitoring and more emerging competitors and clients, the problem of maximizing revenue becomes more complicated. Therefore, it will be increasingly important to develop models for optimizing and pricing cloud services.
According to a forecast from International Data Corporation (IDC), the worldwide spending on public cloud services is expected to surpass $107 billion in 2017. There have been many achievements of cloud-based models. One of the notable examples is Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). Amazon EC2 provides the following purchasing options: On-Demand, Reserved, Spot [5] . The flexible payment options make it a great success. A challenging study is a joint offering of these three different pricing plans. Being relative to the Amazon cloud platform providing simple services such as rental storage space, the pricing decision under a cloud manufacturing mode is much more complicated, because the price is not adjustable dynamically; moreover, the platform provides many more manufacturing services and combinations, which would involve complex interactions among parties to blend them to form an organic whole.
First, not enough research papers on the uncertainty in the pricing decision problem have yet been published. Generally, in most of the literature, it is assumed that the toll collector and the customer are deterministic and transparent under conditions of complete information. The deterministic version of the problem has been well investigated. Reference [6] studied the pricing problem of a cloud computing service with a resource service guarantee. Reference [7] proposed a price-demand mathematical model designed for pure query services with a cloud cache under a short-term forecast.
However, creation of a cloud manufacturing monitoring platform based on the Internet will inevitably lead to a delay in information transfer or difficulty in ensuring accuracy, credibility, and integrity. The asymmetry of information acquisition will further affect the willingness to cooperate and game behavior. Therefore, the uncertainty of cloud monitoring includes four kinds: (1) fuzzy, such as for scale classification and management level in enterprise platform evaluation, where the evaluation standard of classification is often difficult to define; (2) random, such as downtime of production equipment and number of time changes; (3) greyness, such as the quantity of equipment of potential customers not being specifically identified, and only the range is known; (4) unascertainty, such as saving of human resource cost as a benefit of centralized monitoring being determined objectively, but not being clear for human subjective thought.
Usually in the literature, it is assumed that costs are fixed and transparent and known to both fee-setter and clients in a full information situation. However, practical cost is rarely equal to expected cost. Hence, stochastic extensions of the problem have gained more interest in recent years. Reference [8] developed resilient production plans in light of the high degree of uncertainty in market demands and prices with a multi-period stochastic planning model.
Through the analysis of research results, we find that there are mainly three ways to solve the problem of service composition in an uncertain environment: stochastic optimization, robust optimization, and dynamic programming.
Secondly, the existing literature has not paid much attention to the multistage and dynamic aspects in the decision-making process. However, the service in a cloud manufacturing environment is much more complex than the traditional e-commerce platform, because it involves many links, such as the construction of sensor network and platform, charging and pricing and contract signing, real-time monitoring of production equipment, fault early warning, and maintenance task scheduling. Moreover, it not only lasts for a long time, in a wide range, and with a large transaction amount, but also involves different parties with high degrees of autonomy and their respective expectations. Therefore, how to establish a fair and reliable service network, safeguard the interests of all parties, and reduce risks is one of the key problems in the implementation of cloud manufacturing mode. The main methods used in the existing literature are game theory and system dynamics, and the aim is to analyze the equilibrium point of the system by discussing the income of the parties. A bilevel programming (BP) model can be used to describe the process of the decision-making game for two decision-makers with principal and subordinate relations. The upper level decision-makers first make the decision dimension, and the lower decision makers make the optimal decision and feed back to the upper level. This is in line with the fact that the public cloud platform decision-makers first make the pricing rules, and then the clients make decisions on whether to participate. Some have studied the application of bilevel programming and robust optimization or a chance constraint framework to pricing problems. Reference [9] considered different application areas of toll roads. Reference [10] studied the collaborative mechanism with game theory. Bilevel programming is often used to model a hierarchical system, especially for an optimal price setting problem [15] - [17] . Interested readers are also referred to reference [12] for a review.
Our model is different from [15] - [17] in two aspects: (1) in our bilevel model, uncertainty is taken in to consideration by chance constraints; (2) each lower level problem is an integer programming problem rather than an LP problem, which has been used for many papers.
In all of these works, with the comparison of the main literatures shown in Table 1 , the models considered are dis-9474 VOLUME 6, 2018 tinct from our model and problem setting. Understanding the pricing problem in a bilevel optimization model will provide useful insight into the complexity of fee-setting under uncertainty and on the cloud monitoring value network. The ideas which we propose in this research provide a basis for solving the fee-pricing problem in more complicated conditions. The pricing problem for cloud-based platforms fosters an interesting stream of interdisciplinary research between the fields of manufacturing, science, computer science, and economics.
The contributions of this paper include: 1) A novel bilevel optimization model that is able to capture the interaction between the fee-setter and its clients is developed for the optimal fee problem. 2) Uncertainty in unplanned downtime rate of each client is considered, and a chance-constrained programming technique is employed, and 3) the proposed model is evaluated using large-scale data from a real cloud platform we developed.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no research on pricing for a decentralized system, especially for a cloud manufacturing platform, in the presence of uncertainty. To deal with such a complex system, a chance-constrained bilevel pricing model is proposed, which simultaneously takes profit maximization and risk control into account. Some ideas of chance constraint are very near to the literature cited above, but the model in this paper is more complicated because the services of cloud monitoring are diverse, with different service-level agreements under uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a definition for the interaction between clients and fee-setter, and analyze a multiplayer game. Then, in Section 3, we use the framework of a chance-constrained bilevel model, which is very useful in making optimal decisions under uncertain information, and a multiplayer game. In Section 4, we develop a cloud platform for the chemical industry, design computational experiments, conduct the experiment, and analyze the results. Finally, in Section 5, we provide possible extensions to solve the robust pricing problem under more general and complicated conditions.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we describe the interaction between clients and cloud providers, and the value network with various types of services.
From business analysis perspective, a value network of cloud monitoring describes social and technical resources within monitoring businesses, as shown in Figure 1 . The nodes in the value network represent six roles: monitoring platform (provider or owner of the platform), clients (chemical plants), fee-setter (pricing decision makers), maintenance workers, network suppliers, and equipment factories (or equipment suppliers). The nodes are connected by interactions that represent tangible and intangible delivery of value.
The monitoring platform contains mainly a data center and a monitoring center, as shown in Figure 3 . The data center provides web server, application server, data server, backup server, etc. The monitoring center provides real-time detection information with large screens. It provides different types of services and different Quality of Service (QoS) that fulfills client requirements. The platform provider objectives are maximization of revenue and maximum promotion of the platform by setting an optimal price (annual fee)with the help of historical data from previously observed clients.
Clients decide whether to participate and how much equipment to involve in the monitoring platform according to their own production safety risks and costs, including the annual fee specified by the platform. Clients desire the maximum safety and lowest cost. A client-side network is a prerequisite for participating in the platform. Client-side network indicates resident infrastructure installed on the client side, which includes sensors, local network, and servers.
Network suppliers provide software and hardware infrastructure, including sensors, Internet, data storage, and servers through lease or outright purchase based on market prices. The construction of network infrastructure is the main cost driver of platform development.
Equipment factories or suppliers sell production equipment to clients and provide a monitoring interface to the platform. Through the interface, the platform improves equipment safety and maintainability and improves the performance of equipment, which can increase equipment sales and price. This is the motivation for the equipment factories to join the platform. An equipment factory may supply equipment to many chemical plants (clients). The game participation of equipment suppliers will be considered in the trilevel programming model, and is omitted in the bilevel programming model of the paper.
Maintenance workers are the on-site monitoring workers employed and paid by platform or clients. If employed and paid by the platform, they are employees outsourced from clients to platform. Usually, the labor cost is reduced due to worker sharing and integrated scheduling based on the platform. Maintenance workers execute real-time monitoring of production and equipment safety at the client site or monitoring center, and undertake maintenance tasks after the platform gives a warming signal of equipment failure. The platform assigns the nearest maintenance worker from the failure location to carry out repairs to reduce the cost. Maintenance workers are divided into two categories: resident workers employed in a factory or outsourced to the platform, whose task is to monitor plant equipment; and third-party workers assigned by the platform to undertake the maintenance task, based on nearness to the failure location or possession of the best skills for the task. The emergence of third-party workers gives the platform owner a new way to save cost through centralized management of human resources.
Value chains related with fees and equivalent parallel value chains are constructed as shown in Figure 2 . In the proposed model from the consideration of the client status and practical needs, a cloud monitoring service provider offers two main types of service modes, namely, a basic access agreement and a deep cooperation agreement. These main modes can have two transition states. Therefore, there are four modes in all. The service is different, and the costs and fees are also different.
The basic access agreement includes the value chain a11-a12-a3. These services contain only the basic system access service. In addition, clients build a client-side sensor network and hire maintenance workers by themselves. The deep cooperation agreement includes the value chain a21-a22-a3. These services include management of client-side maintenance staff and construction of a clientside sensor network besides the system access service. It is necessary to emphasize that if the ownership of client-side maintenance staff has been outsourced to the platform in the deep cooperation agreement, then the platform has the right to integrated worker regulation across clients to save costs in human resources; moreover, the platform has the duty to build a client-side sensor network for clients and to compensate for failure loss to clients. Obviously, the annual fee for a deep cooperation agreement usually is much higher.
Compared with a basic access agreement, a deep cooperation agreement provides clients a high level of cooperation. A deep cooperation agreement represents a certain degree of guarantee on fulfillment of requested production safety and associated compensation from the platform provider to the clients if the safety guarantee cannot be fulfilled.
In Figure 2 , a value network G with a single beginning and a single endpoint is defined, with G = (N, A) , where N represents a set of n nodes, and A is a set of α arcs. The arc set A of the network G is partitioned into two subsets, A1 and A2, where A1 denotes the basic access program with a set of fee-free services (Self-built and Self-hire), and A2 denotes the deep cooperation agreement with its set of services with charges. There can be more than one set of parallel service items between any two nodes in G.
In a basic access agreement, the cost paid by clients is composed of two parts: an annual fee f b -set by the fee-setter for basic access service, and a self-built cost (c built ) for hiring maintenance workers and building a client-side network. In a deep cooperation agreement, the cost paid by clients is an annual fee f b , which usually is higher than f b because theconstruction of a client-side network and the hiring of maintenance workers have been outsourced to the platform and corresponding costs have been added into f b .In a simple case, an arc a ∈ A1 only bears the basic fee. Another arc a ∈ A2 bears costs besides the basic fee. However, in complex cases, the paths of the two agreements cross, and the services can be chosen and combined freely, and a variety of possible paths arises.
Platform profit is a metric defined as the annual fees collected during a time period minus the costs incurred in the same time period. Gray shading indicates the activities of non-fee costs.
III. BILEVEL MODEL A. DETERMINISTIC BILEVEL MODEL
In this section, we propose a bilevel programming model [11] for the price-setting problem. A bilevel programming problem has two decision makers, namely, a leader and a follower. The leader makes a decision first, and the follower makes decisions later, i.e., after the leader's decision is known to the follower. One important feature of the bilevel programming problem is that the leader has no power to make decisions for the follower, but can only affect the follower through its own decisions.
In our context, the platform is considered as the leader, which sets the price, and each client is a follower. As many clients are participating in the service offered by the platform, our bilevel model has one leader and multiple followers. Before presenting the bilevel programming model, we first introduce notation:
Sets:
I the set of clients, indexed by i. 
Parameters:
The profit of the platform is the sum of service fees received from its clients minus the sum of costs of monitoring clients' equipment, labor, and platform construction. VOLUME 6, 2018 For problem (3)-(5), the i th client's profit comes from its cost reduction, which includes the savings from decreased downtime, from the reduced number of workers to take care of the equipment through the basic service, and from outsourcing through the deep cooperation service. Here we mention that, the labor cost reduction rate due to outsourcing, which is c i 6 includes all the labor cost reduction when a client participates in the deep cooperation service. The constraint states that the client has three choices: to participate in basic service, to participate in deep cooperation service, or not to participate at all. In particular, if a client only wants its equipment to be monitored but does not want to outsource its works, it may choose to participate in basic service; and on the contrary, if a client tries to reduce its labor cost by outsourcing its works, it may prefer using the deep cooperation service; nevertheless, if the service fee is too high, clients will tend to not participate.
Hence, each client maximizes its profit by selecting one of these three choices, whereas the platform attempts to maximize its profit by setting the price for each type of service.
For a bilevel programming problem, a technical issue arises when the lower level problem has multiple optimal solutions. To have a bilevel problem well defined, a so-called optimistic assumption is often made, i.e., if the follower has multiple optimal solutions, it always picks the one that is the best for the leader. For our problem, this assumption is reasonable, as the platform and its clients are generally cooperative.
From problem (3)- (5), we can see that each client either has all of its equipment monitored or does not participate at all, but would not have part of its equipment monitored. This is because having part of its equipment monitored is never going to be an optimal decision for them. To see this, we consider the case in which client i chooses the basic service It is clear that the following must be true: c i 4 +c 5 −x B ≥ 0,; otherwise, using the basic service would make the client lose money. Since c i 4 + c 5 − x B ≥ 0, the objective function is nondecreasing in y i B , and the optimal solution is y i B = k i . For the case where the client chooses to use the deep cooperation service, we obtain a similar result.
B. BILEVEL MODEL WITH CHANCE CONSTRAINT
In practice, uncertainty is almost everywhere, and chance constraint is one way of dealing with uncertainty. For our problem, reducing the unplanned downtime rate is the main reason for clients to use the service. However, as its name suggests, unplanned downtime rate is not fully under control, and thus is considered a random variable. While keeping the notation unchanged, we further introduce some additional 
where b i is a random variable representing the expected unplanned downtime when client i participates in either the basic service or the deep cooperation service, and the platform would incur a compensation cost from client i if a i ≤ b i . Therefore, the platform needs to ensure that the compensation cost will not exceed its budget B with high probability, which is . This requirement is represented by constraint (9). Furthermore, if b i are jointly normally distributed with expectation E(b i ) and covariance matrix Cov(b i ), (9) is equivalent to:
where
, |I| is the number of clients, and −1 (.) is the inversed standard normal distribution function. It is known that (11) is a second-order cone constraint if ≥ 0.5 [14] .
C. SINGLE LEVEL REFORMULATION METHOD
The proposed DBPM and CCBPM are very capable, as they consider the platform and all of the clients simultaneously. Thus, equilibrium is achieved when they are solved to optimality. However, solving those two models is very challenging. It has been proven that even the simplest bilevel problem in which there is only one leader and one follower and all of the objective functions and constraints are linear is NP-hard [13] . Since each lower level problem is an integer programming problem for a given price, the very popular KKT conditions based reformulation is no longer available. To solve such a challenging problem, we first investigate its structure to get some insights.
We first observe that, for a given price (x B ,x D ), the optimal value of client i is max{c i 4 k i +c 5 
as it only has three choices. Hence, any optimal solution to the i th problem satisfies the following system: 
To see this equivalency, we consider the following system:
(17) and (18) are identical to (12) and (13), respectively, which ensure the feasibility of (z i B ,z i D ), while (19) guarantees the optimality. As (14)- (16) are equivalent to (19), the result follows. Therefore, we can reformulate CCBPM as the following single level problem: 
where M is a large positive number. x D z i D can be replaced by t i D in the same way through linearization, and thus problem (20)-(27) becomes a mixed integer second-order cone programming problem, which can be solved by solvers such as Cplex. For DBPM, we can apply the same approach to obtain a single-level problem, which is a mixed integer linear programming problem.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL AND NUMERICAL STUDY A. PLATFORM STRUCTURE
Having obtained the analytical expressions, several numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate the structural properties of the problem and to gain more managerial insights regarding the optimal annual fee and service agreement the platform provides. The effects of the model characteristics on the profit of the platform and associated optimal compensation to clients are investigated.
The platform operator, JBL, is a chemical equipment manufacturing company located in China's FESHAN city. The company has developed a remote monitoring cloud platform with the network structure shown in Figure 3 . This platform gives the company the ability to monitor its production lines established all around the world through the network. Through observation of data obtained from the production lines, potential and early faults can be forecast and warnings given ahead of their actual occurrence.
The platform operator's main objective is to maximize revenue from fees. Therefore, fee-setting can be the determining factor for the success of the platform project and the key to profit maximization. Optimization of fee-setting depends on understanding fully the clients' options compared to the platform with fee.
According to our investigation, in the first year the platform started to be online, about 12 clients(chemical factories) had tried to use the platform without paying. Some client factories have said that they will think about contract extension if the platform is no longer free and the annual fee is high.
The sensors' signal acquisition scheme is as follows: each piece of equipment has an average of six parameters to be monitored, in which two parameters use wireless sensor acquisition and four parameters use wired sensors. The wired sensors collect and upload data every 0.5 second; the wireless sensors collect and upload data every 0.5 minute. According to statistics, an average parameter accounted for 8 bytes. The average annual storage space for a piece of equipment on the platform is 1.91GB.
Related information on the clients, including the number of pieces of equipment, various types of cost rates, and downtime ratios before and after the use of the platform, are shown in Table 2 . Each b i is assumed to be independent of others,the standard deviation of b i is set to be sd i = (a i − b i )/2, and the covariance matrix can be generated accordingly. Other parameters are set as follows: |I | = 12, c 2 = 24000, c 3 = 6689.51, c 5 = 4396.52, and f = 120000.
B. ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In our study, we consider three typical pricing policies: uniform pricing, grouped pricing, and customized pricing. Under the uniform pricing policy, the platform sets a unique price (x B ,x D ) for all clients, whereas, under the grouped pricing policy, the platform sets the price based on the size (measured by k i ) of the client. In our experiment, the clients are divided into three groups: Small, Medium, and Large. Clients with k i ≤ 20 are assigned to the Small group; clients with 21 ≤ k i ≤ 50 are assigned to the Medium group;
and clients with k i ≥ 51 are assigned to the Large group. For the customized pricing policy, the platform negotiates with each client and sets a different price for each client. We solved the DBPM using Cplex 12.7.1 with M = 10 5 , and the results are shown in Table 3 , where 12 clients are divided into three groups based on their size under the grouped pricing policy. The column ''price (B/D)'' are the prices (in units of $1000 per piece of equipment) for the basic service and deep cooperation service, respectively. The column ''type'' is the type of service a client chooses, and the profit (in units of $1000) is how much the platform can earn under each pricing policy.
From Table 3 , we can see that the platform earns higher profit by setting different prices for different clients. Moreover, if the platform sets prices differently, more clients tend to choose the deep cooperation service. One reason could be that the platform has more opportunity to know more information about its clients if it wants to set a customized price for an individual client or a group of clients with similar size. However, if the platform wants to set a price for each client, it has to negotiate with each client, leading to higher cost such as labor costs. Hence, a more advanced model that considers those negotiation costs is needed, which could be a direction for future research.
In addition to the DBPM, we also applied the CCBPM under the uniform pricing policy for different budgets (B) and conservative levels ( ), and the results are shown in Table 4 and Fig.4 .
It is easy to see that profit is non-decreasing in the budget B, and non-increasing in the conservative level . If the platform is highly risk averse, it tends to set a higher price, which leads to fewer participants, but a higher price also avoids some possible losses by monitoring less equipment. In contrast, if the platform is not highly risk averse or risk neutral, it would operate aggressively by monitoring more equipment. This would result in higher profit and higher risk. We also see that the profit stays stable under a relatively low budget (e.g., B = 600) and changes frequently under a relatively high budget (e.g., B = 800 and B = 1000). This maybe because, when the budget is low, to avoid risk the platform does not have as much flexibility as it would have when the budget is high. Thus, the budget can also be a measure of risk, i.e., high budget means that the platform is not highly risk averse, and low budget means it is. Therefore, the platform needs to make a tradeoff based on its actual operational situations while making decisions.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The service provider first offers two types of service arrangements and associated prices based on the different sizes of clients. Each client selects the preferred contract service that provides it the highest utility. When selecting the arrangement, clients are unaware of exactly how many units of storage space they will consume and how much reduction in unplanned downtime they will gain, which is a random variable to some degree from the viewpoint of both sides. This paper focuses on the need of the large equipment manufacturing industry to adapt collaborative operations to transform the industry to cloud manufacturing services. The focus is the cooperation under cloud manufacturing mode to complete a large complex project. Our evaluation of the proposed solutions demonstrates that a cloud monitoring platform can increase their return by setting an optimal annual fee price. Furthermore, the occurrence and loss of unplanned equipment failures are reduced; moreover, both failure risk and monitoring costs are improved on the platform.
In a fast-moving network access environment, a cloud monitoring service platform can supply a variety of resources, such as equipment monitoring, potential and early fault forecasting, and scheduling maintenance to contracted clients. In addition to price, the service contracts offered by the monitoring platform also specify the compensation once a reduction in failure loss cannot be guaranteed under certain conditions. Creating different contracts with varied agreements and compensation allows the platform to conduct price differentiation to better categorize the clients.
The optimal annual fees for each client were derived based on the rule of service satisfaction, and depend on the different firm size of clients. The results show that when the failure loss and firm size are uncertain, the optimal prices and the related services to be offered are sensitive to whether the services are differentiated and how the clients perceive the ratio for compensation for failure loss. When the services are differentiated and both beliefs of compensation ratios are modest, the dual contract is the optimal; the annual fees for both arrangements are increased to enhance the platform's profit. Numerical experiments were also conducted to gain more managerial insights. The numerical examples show that the platform is able to increase profit by enhancing the clients' beliefs of compensation ratio and the quality of services, thereby inducing clients with low willingness to pay to sign the premium contract. The belief of compensation ratio and the guarantee of reduction in failure loss and worker cost also influence the optimal service contracts offered by the service provider. Another key factor affecting the optimal service contract is the cloud space and sensor network acquired by the platform. A sufficient resource eases the negative effect of penalty costs and allows the service provider to design arrangements with flexibility.
The proposed paradigm and model can be applied to other kinds of public cloud platforms with different SLAs (Service-Level Agreements) defined by users. Our bilevel model provides a general framework for such multiple followers pricing problem. In particular, if more types of service are available, they can be incorporated into the lower level problem, which means the clients will have more choices. Moreover, several extensions are also considered to further investigate the equilibrium strategies. 
